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SELF-SERVICE STORES
mode of limiting and controlling such offensive searches should
be implemented to as great an extent as is consonant with society's
need for protection against the illegal importation of narcotics.
WILLIAM E. HowARD
NEGLIGENCE - RES IPSA LOQUITUR - SELF-SERVICE
STORES
Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 221 A.2d 513
(N.J. 1966).
The plaintiff in a negligence action has traditionally been faced
with proving the essential elements of a tort: right, duty, breach,
proximate cause, and damage. To alleviate the stringent applica-
tion of these elements, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was adopted,
but its success has been limited. In fact, use of the doctrine can
sometimes prove futile, as illustrated in the "slip-and-fall" cases in-
volving self-service stores.
In Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc.,' the plaintiff, while
shopping in a self-service store, slipped on a string bean lying in the
aisle. No evidence was introduced to show how the string bean got
on the floor or for what period of time it had been there. The trial
court, in finding for defendant, said that the plaintiff had not shown
sufficient evidence of the defendant's negligence.2 Wollerman
eventually reached the New Jersey Supreme Court where the deci-
sion was reversed 3
Discussing the high standard of care owed to a business invitee,
the supreme court determined that in a situation such as this, where
the plaintiff would be unable to know whose negligence caused her
injury, it would be inequitable to require a showing that the defend-
ant had failed to exercise care commensurate with the risks in-
volved.4 Although the court did not speak of res ipsa loquitur,
there is a strong indication that it used the doctrine. A character-
istic result of res ipsa loquitur is that the burden of proof is shifted
to the defendant. Evidence that the court has applied the doctrine
is found in its statement that "the situation being peculiarly in the
1221 A.2d 513 (N.J. 1966).
2 d. at 514.
3 Ibid.
4 id. at 515.
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defendant's hands, it is fair to call upon the defendant to explain,
if he wishes to avoid an inference by the trier of the facts that the
fault probably was his."5
If the court has in effect used res ipsa loquitur, it must be real-
ized that this is an extension of its application, because in a majority
of the previous cases involving self-service stores one of the neces-
sary elements of the theory - control - has not been found to be
possessed by the store owner.6  The Wollerman court seemingly
waived the control requirement by reviewing the duty owed to a
business invitee and redefining the duty owed by a self-service store
owner.
7
It has long been recognized that a high standard of care must
be exercised toward the self-service patron because: (1) the owner
enjoys lower operating costs by employing fewer people, thus in-
creasing the danger of substances being left on the floor; (2) the
floors are hard and often sticky; (3) there is constant handling of
merchandise; (4) the displays often attract attention away from the
floors; and (5) there is heavy traffic on the floors and a high proba-
bility of goods falling on them.' These factors, coupled with the
feeling that store owners should anticipate that misplaced goods
will find their way to the floor and thereby injure a customer, were
said to raise a presumption that the store owner failed to fulfill his
duty.9 The court in essence made the store owner liable for injuries
caused by a dangerous condition of which it felt he had actual or
constructive knowledge.'0
5 Ibid.
6 E.g., Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 26 N.J. 595, 141 A.2d 301 (1958).
7221 A.2d at 514-15.
8 Carrol, Supermarket Liability: Problems in Proving the Slip-and-Fall Case in
Florida, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 440, 445 (1965). It should be remembered that these
stores are designed to attract the customer's attention to the food and not to the sur-
rounding area. Accordingly, an Ohio court stated: "The customer who enters a store
looking at the merchandise that is displayed to attract his attention and interest is not
expected or bound to look minutely at the floor for dust upon it unless somebody or
something warns him to do so." Bickley v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 62 Ohio App. 180,
184, 23 N.E.2d 505, 507 (1938).
9 221 A.2d at 514-15.
10 See Jeffries v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 176 Neb. 347, 125 N.W.2d 914 (1964),
wherein it was said:
[T]he storekeeper is ordinarily liable if the condition was created by the
storekeeper or his employees. When the condition results from the conduct
of the public, a storekeeper can be held subject to liability only for a negligent
omission on his part to remove the hazard created after he knows of it, or,
by the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of its existence. Id.
at 351, 125 N.W.2d at 916-17.
See generally PROSSER, TORTS § 61 (3d ed. 1964).
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The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only creates a presumption
which will protect the plaintiff from nonsuit or dismissal; it will not
make the owner responsible for all that happens in his establish-
ment." Granting that the doctrine should not make the self-ser-
vice store owner an insurer,'" there is still the problem of deciding
when the storekeeper is liable and what he must do to avoid this
liability. It seems fairly certain that he will have to keep his store
dean, but how often must he survey the store? There has been
some indication that the owner will be held to have constructive no-
tice of the substance's presence in periods as short as twelve to thirty
minutes or as long as two hours.'3 A better approach would be to
measure his duty in light of the store's traffic. When the store is
busy the obligation to observe the aisles would be greater, and when
the store is less busy, the floor should be swept each half-hour. Such
a vigilance would better secure the customers' safety and would not
be an excessive burden on the storekeeper. Moreover, if the owner
knows that he may be called upon to show how he operates his es-
tablishment, he will be inclined to watch more carefully.
The "deep-pocket" theory is a persuasive argument which can
be made in favor of extending to self-service stores the use of res
ipsa loquitur. The theory assumes that the store owner can foresee
that injuries may occur on his premises, and therefore in anticipa-
tion he may obtain insurance to cover his liability, whereas the
patron usually lacks such protection. Also involved in the "deep-
pocket" theory is the fact that the storekeeper has the opportunity
to spread the loss. He may be able to deduct some of the loss as
an operating expense, or he may raise the price on certain goods
and thereby diffuse the loss in small monetary units among many
1 1 The facts of the incident may warrant an inference of negligence, but they do
not compel this inference; it will call for, but not require, explanation or rebuttal.
Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913). In Professor Prosser's opinion the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur does not compel a decision for the plaintiff nor does it require a
defendant to refute a presumption. According to Prosser the jury is permitted to
draw an inference of negligence but is not compelled to do so. PRossm, op. cit. supra
note 10, § 40, at 233. However, some courts have taken the position that the defend-
ant does have the burden of showing that he was not negligent Anderson v. Marshall
Field & Co., 25 I1. App. 2d 253, 166 N.E.2d 451 (1960). This does not make the
defendant an insurer, since a valid defense will rebut the presumption.
2 E.g., Thompson v. Giant Tiger Corp., 118 N.J.L 10, 189 Atl. 649 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1937); Simpson v. Duffy, 19 N.J. Super. 315, 88 A.2d 230 (App. Div. 1952).
See also 39 OHIo JuR. 2D Negligence § 63, at 584-85 (1959) where it is stated: "A
storekeeper, however, is not an insurer against all accidents and injuries to his patrons
while in his store, and the mere fact that a customer fell in the store or other place of
business is not sufficient to show negligence on the part of the proprietor." (Footnotes
omitted.)
13 Carrol, supra note 8, at 450.
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